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OnOctober 12, 1977, PresidentCartersigned into
law the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) as
Title VIII ofthe Housing andCommunity Develop-
ment Act of 1977. The act was designed to encour-
age financial institutions "to help meet the credit
needs of the local communities in which they are
chartered." To meet that intent, the CRA directs
each federal financial supervisory agency to take
into account an institution's CRA record when rul-
ing on branch, merger, orother applications.
The affirmative orientation of the CRA repre-
sents a significant departure from earlierbank regu-
lation, which had been designed primarily to ensure
the safety and soundness of the banking system.
Regulators examine banks' financial structure and
portfolio quality, for example, to monitor their
overall soundness and thereby to minimize the inci-
dence of bank failure and the disruptions to finan-
cial markets that might ensue. Similarly, they regu-
late competitive structure in banking markets-
through chartering, branching, and merger regula-
tion-presumably with the intention ofpreserving
vigorous rivalry withoutpromoting" overbanking"
ofindividual markets.
Bankers and economists may not all agree that
such regulation is necessary (or even desirable) to
achieve the goal ofa stable banking system. None-
theless, such regulation does not usually call into
question the basic ability ofa competitive banking
market to make socially appropriate allocative deci-
sions. The passage ofthe CRA, on the other hand,
indicates that Congress questioned the ability ofthe
market to produce desirable patterns ofcredit use.
Moreover, by linking the CRA to the regulatory
approval of merger and other applications, Con-
gress has made the future development ofbanking
markets contingent on current patterns of credit
service to the community.
This paper traces the origins of the Community
Reinvestment Act and examines its aims and the
extent to which those aims are being met by the
currentenforcementprocess. Section I sets forth the
legislative history of the CRA. Sections II and III
describe the law in more detail with specific focus
on its enforcement. Section IV examines the prob-
lem of detecting noncompliance with the anti-
redlining provisions ofthe CRA, with special atten-
tion to the agencies' evaluation methodologies and
the community group and academic studies of the
"redlining" phenomenon. Section V presents our
conclusions and discusses the policy implications of
a possible alternative evaluation method to those
currently used to enforce the Act.
Anti-discrimination and anti-redlining legisla-
tion was already in place at the time the CRA was
formulated, but community groups saw this earlier
legislation as ineffective in structure and applica-
tion. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (1975),
for example, required financial institutions to dis-
close data on the volume of mortgage loans ona
census tract or zip code basis. Such disclosure of
geographic lending patterns was intended to pro-
vide an overt mechanism for detecting redlining-
but provided no mechanism for imposing govern-
I. Legislative History and Intent of the eRA
The CRA had its origins in long-standing allega-
tions by community groups that financial institu-
tions discriminate against certain neighborhoods in
credit decisions. The practice, called neighborhood
"redlining", allegedly contributes to and even
causes the decline ofinnercity neighborhoods.
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19mental sanctions should such behaviorbe detected.
Similarly, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974)
prohibited discrimination in credit transactions on
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
sex, marital status, or age, but did not address
problem of "geographic discrimination" im'ol1/ed
in redlining. Dissatisfaction with the thrust
plementation of legislation led citizens'
groups to and pressure on
Congr'ess and the agencies.
The response was an bill (Senate
bill 406), which would have the federal
regulatory agencies to encourage financial institu-
tions to "help meet the credit needs of the local
communities." banks already were re-
quired to serve the "convenience and needs" of
their I the sponsors ofthe bill felt that
"convenience and needs" had focused traditionally
on the provision facilities. Thepassageof
the would ensure that, in the "con-
venience and needs" consideration also included
credit services. The bill's proponents felt
the "semiexclusive franchise" that govern-
ment granted financial institutions obligated those
institutions to pursue "community" as well as pri-
vate entrepreneurial goals. More specifically, the
draft bill emphasized that a financial institution's
first obligation was to the credit needs of its "pri-
mary service area"---defined as an area
from which 50 percent ofthe institution's deposits
were derived. Thus institutions could not "export"
credit from the community from which deposits
were drawn without first to that area's
credit demands.
saw in these an unrealistic view
ofthe role offinancial institutions andachallenge to
the traditional market mechanism of allocating
credit. As a modified the initial bill
sutlst,mtiially, removing, for the very spe-
cific focus on the''primary service area"
and ' undefined. In ad(iitl,on,
it deleted reporting requirements and inserted apro-
hibition against the imposition of any additional
administrationburdens on affected financial institu-
tions. Furthermore, the bill's sponsors argued re-
pe,lte1jly in committee discussions that the bill was
not an to allocate credit.
the final bill which becametheCommunity
Reinvestment Act avoided the direct condemnation
of''exportation" ofcredit, because Congressclear-
ly wished to avoid anocating credit or doing any-
that sacrifice the safety
and soundness ofthe banking system. At the same
time, however, the law retainedthe ideaof"serving
the needs ofthe community," with an emphasis on
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. The
reconciliation ofthese two potentiallycontradictory
aims was left to the regulatory agencies. 2
II. Regulatory Implementation
Congress gave the financial regulatory agencies
the taskofdrafting regulations which both reflected
Congressional intent and provided compli-
ance for financial institutions. The agen-
cies involved-the Federal Reserve Board ofGov-
ernors, the Federal Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB), and the of
(OCC)-completed the assigned task by October
1978. The following discussion covers the Federal
Reserve's Regulation BB, which is the same in all
res'pects as the promulgated by
the otheragencies.
Regulation BB reflects the apparent Congres-
sional intent that the concept of "community"
errm!l)ve:d in CRA regulations be flexible enough to
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accommodate the myriad markets and service needs
which banks confront. Regulation BB, in fact,
leaves the definition ofgeographic market and ser-
vice orientation up to individual banks. The banks
must prepare a Community Reinvestment State-
ment and make it available to the public.
The statement includes: 1) a clear definition of
market area, without exclusions of low-
and moderate-income areas; 2) a list ofthe types of
credit services offered; and 3) a copy ofthe public
eRA notice, a description of consumers' rights
under the CRA. In each bank must main-
tain a file ofaU comments received with regard to its
community lending practices and must include in
the file its replies to complaints and comments.







i. Origination ofresidential hous-
loans, home
small business or small farm loans
within the bank's orthe of
such loans in its cmnmlunlty;
j. in government-insured, guaran-
or subsidized loan programs for housing,
small businesses, or ~,m§lll
k. Ability to meet various community credit needs,
based on the bank's financial condition and
impeclimlen:ts, local economic conditions,
and other
l. Other factors in the Board's rea-
sonably bear upon the extent to which a bank is
to meet the entire credit
pliance with these procedural requirements, but
also on a bank's behavioral compliance-whether
the bank's actual lending activity meets the "credit
needs of the community." RegUlation BB
provides only general guidance for compliance, by
twelve factors the Federal Reserve will con-
sider when its CRA evaluation. These
include:
a. Activities conducted to ascertain a cOlmumnlity's
credit needs, induding the
efforts to communicate with community mem-
bers the credit services it orc>vic!es:
b. Extent of the bank's marketing and
credit-related programs to make community
members aware ofthe credit services it offers;
c. Extent ofparticipation by the board ofdirectors
in fonmulating bank policies and reviewing its
perfonmance with respect to CRA purposes;
d. Any practices intended to disCOllra!se alDDtllca-
tions for types of credit set forth in the bank's
CRA statement(s);
e. Geographic distribution ofthe bank's credit ex-
ten:siorls, credit and creditdellials;
Legal Aspects ofthe eRA
into question if it has the effect of dl~icnmlnal:mg
against acertain neighborhood. In orderto continue
such a practice, the bank must show that it is neces-
sary to the business and that nondiscrimi-
prElCtllce cannot be substituted.
4
Denial of merger or branch applications is the
most severe penalty imposed for noncompliance
with the CRA. However, the Federal Reserve (and
the other agencies) have the authority to condition
approval ofan application on changes in the appli-
cant's mode of business. The Act aplJan;:ntly
is influential somewhat vague in content,
since financial institutions often
reach agreements independently. Most interested
agree that an accurate, measure-
ment method would add a great deal to the current
understanding and enforcement ofthe CRA.
21IV. Problem of Detecting Noncompliance
The original legislation provided very little guid-
ance for detecting noncompliance. The regulations
formulated by the regulatory agencies set forth gen-
eral guidelines for'assessing lenders' behavior.
However, the agencies still had to devise an evalua-
tion method which would yield an accurate detec-
tion ofundesirable behavior, as is described below.
Regulatory Process
The regulatory agencies are involved in CRA
enforcementon two levels. First, the regularexami-
nation process involves routine evaluations ofCRA
compliance. Secondly, as the law states, the agen-
cies must evaluate CRA performance every time a
financial institution applies to branch, merge, or
otherwise expand its operations. In 1980, for exam-
ple, the Federal Reserve processed 917 applications
with CRA implications. Often, in these cases, the
CRA record is determined by studying the bank's
most recent examination report. These analyses are
expanded, however, when a protest arises.
Examiners conduct a CRA compliance exam as
one part of the overall examination which they
regularly make at financial institutions. The twelve
items listed in Regulation BB serve as aguide to the
examiner in determining whether the institution is
complying with CRA procedural requirements. In
addition, the examiner must study the bank's lend-
ing record and its public relations policy as well as
many other factors to determine the degree of be-
havioral compliance. From the observations made
and from contact with community groups, the
examinerthen makes a final judgmentregarding the
institution's overall record. A rating of 1or 2, on a
scale of I to 5, means that the institution's CRA
record is above average, while a 3 represents a
"less than satisfactory" record. Standardized ex-
amination procedures include a weighting scheme
designed to cover all twelve assessment factors of
Reg BB, but examiners still have some latitude in
assessing performance. The agencies, therefore,
admittedly rely on the subjective analysis ofexperi-
enced staffmembers.
The regulatory agencies have developed a joint
evaluation handbook as well as rigorous training
programs, but many observers remain uneasy about
the regulatory methods ofevaluation and enforce-
ment. 5 Even the examination handbook acknowl-
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edges the lack of a standardized evaluation tech-
nique, when it notes that''the examiner is expected
to adjust the CRA procedures on a case-by-case
basis to accommodate institutions that vary in size,
expertise, and locale."6 In fact, a financial institu-
tion can attempt to serve its community's needs in
myriad ways, and somehow the examiner must de-
termine whether the institution's effort is adequate.
Resolution of a protest also involves evaluation
of CRA compliance. The protest process begins
when a group claims that an institution has failed to
serve a community'S credit needs. The group then
submits a protestto the appropriate regulatory agen-
cy asking that the institution's applicationto expand
be delayed until after examination ofits CRA rec-
ord. When the Federal Reserve is involved, the
Board first determines whether the protest is non-
substantive on its face or whether it warrants a
detailed investigation-and in the latter case, it
conducts a thorough analysis of the bank's CRA
performance.
In practice, the Federal Reserve first attempts to
create a constructive dialogue between the protest-
ers and the bank to clarify the issues. Often acase is
then dismissed due to a prior misunderstanding of
the law orbecause ofpoorcommunication. At other
times, the two parties reach an agreement on their
own and the group drops the protest. However,
sometimes a thorough investigation is necessary,
and in such cases, the Board may hold a public
meeting where both sides may present their views.
The Federal Reserve's analysis entails the eval-
uation ofthe statements ofthe two parties and some
investigative research. The agency studies the
bank's marketing programs, along with other fac-
tors which may reflect the affirmative action it has
taken to serve community credit needs. To detect
whether actual lending behavior is in compliance
with the CRA, it also examines data available as aresult of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA data), often along with real estate transfer
records and bank loan applications to account (at
least partially) for loan demand. Otherrelevantdata
include information on neighborhood characteris-
tics, compiled from such information sources as
U.S. Census data and city planning records. Using
all of these sources, the Board's Research staff
recommends whether the protest is substantive-
and whether the bank's application to expand its
operations should be approved, approved subject to
certain conditions, or denied. The Board's decision
is based on some objective analysis coupled with a
subjective judgment of the bank's behavior and
management attitudes. Precedents are set on a case
by case basis.
One possible way of handling a protest case is
"conditioned approval," whereby the application
is approved subject to certain requirements. For
example, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ap-
proved the application ofMidwest Federal Savings
and Loan Association, Minot, North Dakota, to
establish a new branch-providedthat the Associa-
tion change its delineation of its local community
and withdraw its policy ofrefusing to make mobile
home loans on American Indian reservations unless
the policy could be shown to have a firm economic
basis.
On other occasions, a bank and a protesting
group have privately agreed on conditions, leading
the community group to dropits charges. Landmark
Bancshares Corporation of Clayton, Missouri, for
example, upon protest of its application to acquire
Ladue Bank and Trust Company, made an agree-
ment with the Missouri Association ofCommunity
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). The
agreement, which led ACORN to drop charges,
included a commitment of $1 million for home
improvement loans and mortgage loans to the
Wellston, Missouri community at below market
rates. Clearly, in cases such as these, conditioned
approval and private agreement raise concerns
about credit allocation, an activity not intended by
Congress. The Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis,
reflecting the Federal Reserve System's opinion,
held, in the Landmark Bancshares case, that''since
the Board of Governors has stated that neither the
Bank Holding Company Act nor the Community
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Reinvestment Act requires that the Board impose
commitments to allocate credit, the Reserve Bank
does notendorse anyterm ofthe agreementbetween
applicant and protestant which may have such a
result."
7
As these examples show, the costs involved in
lodging a protest are usually relatively low. On the
other hand, the protest process can be costly to the
institution involved. First, conditioned approval or
private agreements can result in significant finan-
cial commitments. Second, the application to
expand must be delayed until the CRA issue is
resolved. The bank must not only pay the costs
incurred in public meetings (legal fees, etc.) but
also those resulting from substantial delays in ex-
pansion plans, including the costs ofaffected com-
petitive positions. In addition, protesters need not
be community groups, but can even include com-
peting banks, which sometimes file CRA protests,
presumably with the hope ofdelaying orpreventing
competitors' expansion plans.
In view ofthe high costs ofan inaccuratedecision
to all parties involved, the regulatory agencies
should attempt to devise the best possible methods
of detecting CRA violations and to encourage the
use of the best methods by protesters. In essence,
regulators have relied on atwo-part approach. First,
regulators focus considerable attention on what
could be called affirmative marketing efforts. In
this regard, the law is designed to ensure that the
demand for loans is not adversely affected by alack
of knowledge about availability. Since marketing
efforts such as advertising, community meetings
and discussions with realtors can enhance the flow
of information between potential loan applicants
and lenders, the monitoring of such efforts under
the CRA probably improves the efficiency of the
marketplace. It is probably impossible to measure
the optimum level of market information, so it is
reasonable to use onlygeneral criteria to formjudg-
mentson a bank's performance in this area.
A second importantpartofthe CRAenforcement
process involves the examination ofactual lending
activity to determine evidence (ifany) ofdiscrimi-
nation. Here, detailed objeCtive analysis is desir-
able, despite the difficulty of developing a good
evaluation method for detecting noncompliance.The remainderofthe paper, therefore, addresses the
problems associated with those CRA enforcement
procedures which focus on possible discriminatory
lending patterns, orredlining.
Definition ofRedlining
Part ofthe trouble in this area stems from the lack
of a generally accepted definition of redlining.
Before choosing a method for detecting violations,
it is essential to decide on a correct legal definition
of redlining and determine what type of behavior
would be deemed unacceptable. From the begin-
differences ofopinion arose overthe intent of
the CRA, and these differences naturally carried
over into the debate overthe definition ofredlining.
Community groups and other CRA proponents,
being concerned about urban "disinvestment,"
criticized as redlining any lending behavior result-
ing in an uneven distribution ofloans across neigh-
borhoods, regardless of the reason for this pattern.
In their view, lending policies that create uneven
distributions of mortgage credit have the effect of
discriminating. Many also argued that banks have
an obligation to make every effort to serve their
communities, even ifthis means lower profits than
could be earned elsewhere. By refusing to lend in a
neighborhood, for whatever reason, community
groups claim banks otherwise would create an ex-
ternality effect: deterioration ofthe community.
Under the community groups' definition, suc-
cessful CRA enforcementwould mean a more equal
distribution ofloans across neighborhoods. Evalua-
tion methods devised under this approach simply
involve the examination of loan distribution pat-
terns for inequalities, as discussed below. How-
ever, in its final form, the CRA falls far short of
mandating credit allocation or affirmative urban
renewal efforts ifthey are unprofitable. Instead, the
law seems to recognize that there may be sound
business reasons for an uneven pattern ofloans-
partly reflecting differences in demand across
neighborhoods, but also lenders' recognition of
higher risks in certain areas. In the economic litera-
ture, this type of lender behavior is referred to as
"rational" redlining. Lenders who operate effi-
ciently will make loans to minimize risk and maxi-
mize profit, subject to regulations regarding the
overall quality of loan portfolios. We assume here
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that the law was not meant to outlaw rational red-
lining-but rather irrational practices whereby a
lender avoids lending in a certain area despite the
fact that the activity would yield a normal balance
between risk and return. Under irrational redlining a
property's location remains a significant explan-
atory factor for a even after
adjustment for all the factors which might explain
the pattern onthe basisofsound businessjudgment.
This does not mean that a lender who uses a
property's location as a decision criterion necessar-
ily has discriminatory (irrational) intent. To make
economically sensible decisions, lenders must use
the available information to evaluate individual re-
quests for funds. At times, the cost ofobtaining this
information is prohibitively high, so that lenders
may attempt to economize on information costs by
using proxies for certain variables. Ifthese proxies
have statistically significant results, the quality of
the lending decision is probably enhanced. How-
ever, the law prohibits the use of certain variables
(such as zip code), assuming that their use would
have discriminatory effects. This practice may be
rational in a purely private decision-making pro-
cess, but since the law outlaws it in a social context,
we must include such variables in our definition of
irrational redlining.
The use ofthe CRA'santi-redlining provisions to
address irrational redlining gives us the basis for
choosing an appropriate evaluation method. Detec-
tion of irrational redlining requires an understand-
ing of the factors necessary to make a sound busi-
ness decision. We will narrow our focus to the
factors that affect risk and return in the mortgage
market, since it is the behavior of lenders in this
market that has drawn most criticismfrom
proponents. After discussing these factors, we will
examine the evaluation methods devised to detect
redlining by interested parties (community groups,
academicians and regulators) to determine whether
they account for the rational business reasons af-
fecting lending decisions.Demand for Mortgages
Outcomes in the mortgage market (as elsewhere)
result from the interaction of demand and supply
forces. Although the CRA directs its attention to
supply side (i.e., lender) behavior, it is also neces-
sary to specify demand behaviorto extractevidence
on supply behaviorfrom the available data on mort-
gage activity.
According to a number of studies,8 the desired
stock ofhousehold debt is determinedas an element
of a broader decision concerning the consumption
ofhousing and non-housing goods and services. In
the most general models, household wealth, current
income, prevailing interest rates, and market hous-
ing prices are found to determine the demand for
housing and mortgage debt. (Here wealth is defined
as the present value of lifetime earnings plus the
stock ofsavings.)
This relatively straightforward assumption is
complicated, however, by certain imperfections in
the credit and housing markets. First, the progres-
siveness ofincome tax rates and the tax deductibil-
ity ofmortgage interest reduce the after-tax cost of
indebtedness to wealthier households. Second, the
lifetime earnings portion of household wealth is
fairly illiquid; households are typically not able to
borrow against their future income. Coupled with
the convention ofminimum downpayment require-
ments, this fact may make initial savings-and not
simply total household wealth-independently im-
portant to housing and mortgage demand. A house-
hold with a lower level of initial savings would
display a lower effective demand for housing than
an equally wealthy household with a higher initial
level ofsavings.
In addition, the household's current income posi-
tion (rather than its wealth alone) may be an impor-
tant independent factor influencing its housing
ownership decision. With conventional mortgage
instruments, the borrower can encounter cash-flow
problems if the monthly loan payment is large rela-
tive to current nominal income. Lower current
income is likely to result in lower demand for hous-
ing, everything elsebeing equal.
Finally, the variability ofincome may playa role
in the demand for housing and mortgage debt-the
more variable its income, the greater the risk that a
household will be unable to meet mortgage pay-
ments in the normal manner. Because of the high
legal and other costs of meeting (or avoiding) loan
delinquencies and defaults, ahousehold with a vari-
able income may have a lowereffective demandfor
debt and for housing than a similarly situated family
with a stable income.
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"Income variability is defined as the standard deviation of each household's income from its
nine-year-averagetrend values.10
ness of wealth alone (or its reasonable proxy, per-
manent income) as an accurate predictor of the
demand for mortgages. Indeed, data on family
economic characteristics
9 suggest that savings as a
proportion of wealth tends to increase as wealth
increases over much of its range (see Chart 1).
Moreover, poorer households also tend to have
more variable incomes than all but the wealthiest
households (see Chart 2).
These nonlinear relationships suggest that mort-
gage demand on the part ofless wealthy households
should be less than their wealth alone would pre-
dict. Therefore, we would expect to find poorer
households demanding fewer mortgages than richer"
households, even after adjustment for income and
wealth. Since neighborhoods tend to be relatively
homogeneous with respect to household wealth, an
uneven pattern of mortgage lending across neigh-
borhoods may be explained, in part, by these differ-
ences in mortgage demand.
Mortgage Supply
In addition to these demand-side influences, a
number of factors relating to the applicant and the
property will necessarily influence lenders' willing-
ness to supply credit. One major factor is the lend-
er's general inability to obtain security for the loan
by attaching the borrower's future income; thus, the
loan must be secured by the property itself. Factors
bearing on the likelihood and cost of foreclosure
and liquidation will thus influence the lender's wil-
lingness to supply credit. The borrower's ability to
handle the cash-flow burdens of a mortgage, of
course, would be paramount in a bank's assessment
of the risk of foreclosure. Thus, the borrower's
current income, liquid asset position and income
stabilityare all considered by lenders in this regard.
The lender's perceptions about the "quality" of
the real assets securing a loan also will affect the
lender's willingness to make a real estate loan. In
obtaining a secured loan, the borrower in effect
obtains an option to hand over the security (the
house) to the lender and abandon the loan. As op-
tion theory suggests, the more uncertain the future
value ofthe security (the house), the more valuable
this option becomes. Thus, lenders should charge
more or demand more security (by offering a lower
loan-to-value ratio, for example) for a loan on a
property with an uncertain future value. Such un-
certainty typically will arise due to the lender's
assessment of the remaining economic life of the
house. This assessment, in tum, may be a function
of the house's current level of upkeep and of the
maintenance ofnearby properties.
Consequently, we would expectfewer loans to be
supplied to those loan applicants with lower
26incomes, with lower savings/loan ratios, or with
intentions to buy homes with uncertain future value,
all else being equal. The greater income variability
ofpoorerhouseholds (see Chart 2) should also have
consequences for mortgage supply. Lenders would
be willing to supply less mortgage money at any
given mortgage rate to variable-income households
because of potentially greater delinquency and de-
fault risks.
Resultant Lending Patterns
An accurateevaluationmethod for detecting non-
compliance with the CRA, or "irrational" redlin-
ing, thus would necessarily incorporate variables
such as those discussed above. No available data set
wouldpermitus to prove this pointdirectly orto test
directly all the implications of our model on the
demand and supply ofmortgages. However, some
ofthese variables are important to household finan-
cial decisions through their influence on the pattern
ofhome ownership. II
Since households ofvarious wealth levels tend to
be concentrated geographically, these conclusions
about demand and supply factors may translate into
unevenness in the observed number, value, orprice
of mortgage loans across neighborhoods. In partic-
ular, households in poor neighborhoods are likely to
receive less mortgage money than households in
well-to-do neighborhoods. In fact, a comparison of
lending outcomes between inner city and suburban
neighborhoods probably would reveal a pattern of
fewer loans and lower dollar loan values in the
typical American inner city because of its general
pattern of household characteristics. The uneven
distribution can, therefore, often result from ration-
al behavior on the part ofboth lender and potential
loan applicant. However, the evaluation methods
used traditionally by community groups generally
have led them to equate such uneven distributions
with redlining.
Community Group Studies
Because of their limited resources, community
groups have tended to use the simplest analytical
procedures when providing evidence to support
their protests against financial institutions. Typi-
cally, their analysis of residential lending patterns
consists ofconstruction ofsimple indices-such as
loans per census tract-to depict the geographic
patternofmortgage lending. The type ofindices has
depended upon the type ofdata available.
Prior to the passage ofthe HMDA, these groups
obtained their data from manual reviews ofpublic
registers of real estate transactions-as seen, for
example, in the New York Public Interest Research
Group report on redlining in Brooklyn. The report
compared total value ofBrooklyn mortgages made
by certain Brooklyn savings banks to these lenders'
total assets and total mortgage-loan volume. The
resultant ratios were small, and the report's authors
thus inferred that the lenders were redlining Brook-
lyn neighborhoods. 12
The passage of the HMDA considerably facili-
tated this simple index analysis, because it required
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each financial institution to disclose the numberand
value ofall mortgage and home improvement loans
made, by type and by neighborhood (using census
tracts or zip codes to represent neighborhoods). 13
The HMDA provided much of the data used by
community groups to stimulate Congressional in-
terest in the CRA. Forexample, in her March 1979
testimony, Gale Cincotta ofNational Peoples' Ac-
tion used such data to show that three major cities
received a smaller share of urban financial institu-
tions' loans than did their suburbs and non-metro-
politan areas. 14 Ms. Cincotta used this example of
asymmetry between urban and suburban lending
patterns as evidence of the existence of redlining
and ofthe need for the CRA.
The Buckeye-Woodland Community Congress
(BWCC) in Ohio also used HMDA data and simple
index analysis to establish its standing in a eRA
protest. When AmeriTrust, a Cleveland bank hold-
ing company, proposed to acquire a new bank early
in 1980, BWCC alleged that AmeriTrust had a poor
record ofreal estatelending in predominantly blackamUY:Sls.
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be occurring in those markets where the simple
index measures might imply theopposite.
Some groups have the severe limita-
tions ofthe simple index approach andhavetriedto
overcome them-for by using additional
data to for differences in demand. 16
Some have used real estate transfer activity and
other variables as proxies for mortgage demand.
these variables have limited value as
wen, since it is doubtful that con-
trol fordemand factors in a neighborhood. 17
index a'1!lal~{sis
prCIVirlg the existenceofirrational redlining,
its frequent use in CRA protests. To isolate
patterns thatinvolve more than
economically "rational" behavior-namely, to
jr!",ntiJF" disclrimlimltOl"'j and irrational redlining-
for the factors expected to
influence rational behavior.
resear'ch(~rs, in their search for better measurement
methods, have come to employ one of two ap-
I) market models or applications
HMDA data do not correct for population or
differences among and use
would be even to screen for
CRA violations. redlining behavior could
areas of the community. These accusations were
based on simple indices developed from HMDA
data, real estate transferdata, anddepositdata. 15
Although simple index analysis has
effective in att€mtion,
suffers from serious problems.
simple index analysis does not address the problelffi
of irrational It cornp~tres
across and thus cannot
lender is arbitrarily dis1crirninatirlg
neighborhood. Dataon geClgI<lphic lendirlg p::tttems
alone cannot show whethl~r
ofdemandor
the behavior is Hn.v",,"
In these
tion to the impact of risk variatlles
behavior. Without cOIltre1Uirig
legiltimlate]!y influence mortg,:tge dernaJ:1ld
possible to use
Market models
where i is the terms ofthe mortgage, B is a set
borrower characteristics related to creditworthi-
ness, andR is a setofcharacteristicsoftheproperty.
in eq\lililtlrillm,
Md = Ms = Mobserved
and the model can be solved for the relationship
between observed mortgage activity (Mobserved)·and
borrowerand property characteristics:
(1) Mobserved = f B, R).
This "reduced form" is esti-
mated with analysis, data on the
number or value of mortgages made in various
census tracts orneighborhoodsin a certainperiodas
measures ofM. The borrowerarid property charac-
teristics are the average characteristics ofthe occu-
and properties in those tracts.
Within this framework, have
att(~mpted to obtain evidence of in several
ways. Under one approach, certain characteristics
ofthe borrower(such as race) orthe property (such
as the age of in the
considered irrelevantto the banking decision. Thus
if these variables are statistically significant in ex-
plaining observed mortgage activity, the analysts
conclude that is involved.
Hutchinson, Ostas and Reed,19 for example,
found the number of mortgages made in a cross-
section of 120 census tracts in Toledo, Ohio, to be
negatively related to average housing age. They
=
In the market model approach, researchers
recoglliz(~d the demand and
factors in the process that determines ob-
served mortgage activity. Demand for mortgages is
typically assumed to have the form
Md =Md (i, P, X)
where Md is the demand for mortgages, i is the
mortgage interest rate andotherloan terms, P is the




28MiichiJgan Panel Survey data suggest that
variatlles are in of
In addition,
portion of the modg,age
tional mOltgalge lendill1g),
ity of bankers other lend-
ers. The exclusion from these studies of private
now an increas-
mOltgalge supply,
may any findings of redlining behavior,
since lenders may specialize in kinds of
loans and Perhaps neighbdrhoods
Fdr these reasons,. market
solved and are unlikely to resolve about
redlining. Moreover, the difficulties encountered in
verifying allegationsofredliningforthe market as a
whole are multiplied severalfold when a specific
lender's behavior is involved, since the market
mddel must then the market.shares ofvari-
as well
what the
CRA is meant to address. Conceptually, market
models are far superior to the simple index analysis
practiced analysts and some regula-
tory market models have not
det~~ctirlg "redlin-
generally arnbilguolls findings
"oh'"'''''''' sllpelficial e"ldence of
tookthese findings as evidenceofiredlining.
this ap]:)ro~lch,
retrospective analysis.





t()rlsj(lerthi~. evidenceotredlinin,g. Using this
study
"mort-
initialsavings, and income variability inthe
mOltga~;e demand (mainlv
areas typically differ dramatically in borrower and
property chmractlerisl:ics.
YorkCity
With this approach, however, valid comparisons
may not be pdssible becauSe not enough legitimate
factors'influencing mortgage volumes have been
the prediction Richard:i()n
and out the need for
29Applications Analysis
Becauseofthe difficulties encounteredwith mar-
ket models, some academic analysts have tried to
simplify the problem by focusing only on the lend-
er's loan evaluation process. Iflenders reject loan
applications involving properties in certain loca-
tions more frequently than similarapplicationselse-
where, this could be taken as an indication ofpossi-
ble redlining behavior.
In essence, such studies are pure supply studies;
"demand" is given since an application has been
filed. 22 This alleviatesthe problemofmodelling the
demand process. In addition, inferences about indi-
vidual mortgage suppliers can potentially be made
by focusing on the applications process of the
specific lender.
The typical applications analysis model involves
estimation of a mortgage decision relationship of
the form
Prob(MD) = f(i, B, R)
where MD is the mortgage decision made concern-
ing the application (suchas "denial" ofthe applica-
tion), and Prob = f(...) is a function describing the
probability of that decision as a function of i, the
terms of the loan request, B, the characteristics of
the applicant, and R, the characteristics oftheprop-
erty, (including location). This model indicates the
presence ofirrational redlining ifall characteristics
ofthe applicant and the property relevant to a wise
business decision are included and the property's
location is still independently important.
The most thorough study of this type was con-
ducted by Schafer and Ladd for the Department of
Housing and Urban Development.
23 Since such
studies require detailed dataon individual mortgage
applications, the researchers were limited to an
analysis of mortgage markets in New York and
California, where state laws require certain institu-
tionallendersto provide information in applications
registers.
24 The authors obtained information on
allegedly redlined areas, and then tested whether
such property locations were independently impor-
tant in explaining mortgage decisions.
Theresults ofthe study are mixed; the locationof
a property in an allegedlyredlinedareaincreasesthe
probability of adverse treatment by the lender in
some but not all ofthe cities studied. More surpris-
ingly, there are statistically significant cases where
"nonredlined" areas appear to receive less favor-
able consideration than "redlined" areas. Indeed,
in California, there are only six cases in which an
adverse mortgage decision is statisticallymore like-
lyfor central city properties than for suburban prop-
erties; yet there are twenty-one cases where the
reverse is true. Similar, though less pronounced
ambiguities arise from the New York data.
The authors conclude from their results that
"some neighborhoods appear to be redlined and
others do not." An alternative explanation, how-
ever, is the omission of some locally important
variable(s) from the model specification. The appli-
cations data provide relatively good information on
the applicant's financial position (such as some sav-
ings and net worth data), but they lack most infor-
mation thatmightbearonthemarket'sperceptionof
the riskiness of the specific property (with the ex-
ception of age of house). The data thus had to be
augmented with census andotherdata, which might
have been insufficient to the task; indeed, the ana-
lyst really needs all of the data available to the
lender to discern accurately the "unbiasedness" of
the loan decision process. Nevertheless, applica-
tions analysis, by virtue of narrower focus, has
greater practical potential than market modelling or
index analysis for eRAevaluation.
Use ofApplications Analysis
Most of the regulatory agencies have access to
the loan application register (LAR) maintained by
eachinstitution. TheLARis arecordofloansmade,
including details related to the applicant, the prop-
erty and the loan terms. This record must be main-





pilot studyofsuchdatain 1978 todetectdiscrimina-
tion in the overall lending practices ofsavings and
loan associations.
26 Discrimination was defined as
the arbitrary use of applicants' age, race, sex, or
marital status, or property location, to make deci-
sions regarding appraised value, loan acceptance ordenial, or mortgage terms. Violations of CRA
would have been found if property location alone
had made a difference in lending decisions, but
discrimination was not evident after controlling for
applicant and property risk variables.27 The pilot
study demonstrates the agencies' concern about
finding appropriate objective measurements of
CRA compliance. It also suggests that detailed
studies ofindividualapplications reveal more infor-
mation than simple index models and can explain
much "suspect" activity.
v. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper has focused on some ofthe analytical
challenges posed by the Community Reinvestment
Act. Proponents ofthe CRA had many policy aims
in mind-inCluding the regulationofcreditflows to
stimulate redevelopment of deteriorated urban
areas. But in view ofanalytical limitations as well
as Congressional intent in the ultimate CRA legisla-
tion, we believe that enforcement of the CRA's
anti-redlining provisions should centeron detection
ofirrational redlining, or arbitrary geographic dis-
crimination. Indeed, the debate surrounding the
passage of the CRA makes it clear that geographic
creditallocation was not Congressional intent in the
Act's final form.
With this in mind, we have attempted to assess
the usefulness ofvarious analytical techniques and
data sources in detecting the arbitrary use ofprop-
erty location in mortgage lending decisions. We
found that the simple index techniques commonly
used by community groups are likely to be unreli-
able, because they ignore the complexity of the
economic decisions involved in the mortgage mar-
ket. These measures simply do not account for the
sound business reasons or demand factors which
may be the·reason for disparities in loan volumes
amongheighborhoods. We also found that the mar-
ket model approaches used in more sophisticated
studies were also inappropriate, dueto the difficulty
of defining an individual lender's role in such a
complex context. Arnorereliable technique for
evaluating.charges of g~ographic discrimination
may be loan applications analysis, because it
focuses on individual lendihg decisions, while at
the same time drawing on a more complete set of
data thanthe.simple index techniques.
These conclusions suggest that effective CRA
enforcementmay require substantive changes in the
methodology used by regulatorsto assess alender's
CRA performance and to evaluate allegations of
31
redlining. In the absence ofquantitative evaluation
techniques, CRAassessments today largely depend
on the judgment ofCRA examiners. Since the de-
tection of CRA violations is considered ari impor-
tant regulatory responsibility, decisions should be
accurate, and consistently applied, given their far-
reaching consequences. The use of formal, objec-
tive methods of evaluation can make a positive
contribution to both of these goals. Among the
methods that probably should be considered are
those which analyze loan application records.
At the present time, regulators must conduct
thorough analyses ofCRAcompliance when a prot-
estant alleges the existence of redlining and also
during routine examinations. With a loan applica-
tion register readily available for analysis, regula-
tors could address complaints more quickly and
accurately. The burden of the analysis would rest
with the regulatory agencies, which have the appro-
priate staff and resources for the task. This should
serve the desire of Congress to keep enforcement
costs to a minimum. Also, it should save protestants
from the time-consuming, unreliable use ofsimple
index methods, and should reduce the burden ofthe
exi~ting CRA process on affected institutions.
However, the loan application register has draw-
backs also. The need to maintain the necessary
standard-format applications data files would im-
pose a non-trivial compliance burden on affected
institutions. (There is now no standard format nor
standard method of analysis, and lending institu-
tions must only maintain a file oHoan applications
and make these records accessible to regulators.)
The.costsofmaintaining theloanregisterswouldbe
high, especially since relativelyfew banksare faced
withproteSts orallegations ofpoorperfonnance. In
addition, unless institutions were also required to
maintain recordsofall requestsforlending informa-
tion (in addition to formal applications), this
method would not detect "pre-screening" forms oflending discrimination.
Given the serious problems associatedwithexist-
ing evaluation methods, and given the high costsof
a more accurate, (but still imperfect) alternative
method, regulators might do well not to try to detect
redlining per se, but rather to concentrate on en-
couraging the affirmative marketing efforts of
financial institutions. Assuring the free. flow of
information to all market participants should
increase competitive pressures on lenders who dis-
cnmllflate, making them less able to continue such
pr2lcti,ces in the run.
If the efforts to detect redlining are to continue,
however, improvements in evaluation methods may
be necessary. At the very least, analysts should
conduct a more thorough study of the costs and
benefits ofalternative evaluation methods than we
have attempted here. Ouranalysis indicates that the
current method has severe limitations, and that a
more accurate method would involve incorporating
all the information lenders receive in loan applica-
tions. Although the substantial investment of time
and capital necessary to maintain these data may
exceed the explicit costs ofcurrent compliance reg-
ulations, an accurate cost/benefit analysis would
also have to considerthe high, hidden costs incurred
under existing protest procedures-such as con-
cessions made in private agreements, penalties in-
curred through conditioned approvals, legal fees,
and costs of jeopardized
When these hidden costs are taken into account, it is
not obvious that loan applications analysis would be
too costly to implement. Indeed, if eRA enforce-
ment and elimination of discriminatory lending
practices continue to be desirable legislative goals,
a review of the current evaluation method clearly
would be in order.
FOOTNOTES
1. Whenever a bank applies to expand its operations, the
regulatory agency does an analysis of the competitive
effects of the proposed activity and an analysis ofhowthe
expansion meetsthe "convenience and needs"ofthe COm-
munity. Banks must, therefore, include in their applications
descriptionsofhowtheexpansionwiii benefitcustomerS by
improving services in theircommunities.
2. For further details, see U.S. Senate, Hearings before
the Committeeon Banking, Housingand Urban Affairs
01'1 S. 406, "CommunityCreditNeeds," March23-25, 1977,
95(1), and Consumer Bankers Association, A Compliance
Guide for the Community Reinvestment Act: Back-
ground and Implications.
3. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Regulation SS (12 CFR228), effective November6, 1978.
4. Fora thorough discussion oftheeffectstestasitapplies
to consumer credit legislation, see Sarah E. Burns, "Credit
Scoring and the ECOA: Yale
lawJournal,88(7),
5. The General Accounting Office, for example, in a recent
stUdy of the enforcement of several consumer credit lavvs,
was criticalofthe agencies'monitoringofsUbstantive com-
pliance orcompliance with the "basicprinciplesofthe law."
The GAOcomplained thatfewdetailed analyseswerecon-
ducted on the data available. Although the study refrains
from drawingconclusionsonCRAenforcement(sinceeRA
was new at the time), we can probably apply the agency's
findings to CRA aswell. ComptrollerGeneral ofthe United
States, ReporttotheCongress:ExaminationsofFinan-




6. Comptrollerofthe Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Federal
Reserve Board, Community Reinvestment Act Exami-
nation Procedures, November1978, p. 5.
7. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, news release,
November30, 1979.
8. See Diewert, W. E. "Intertemporal Consumer Theory
and the Demand for Durables," Econometrica, May 1974,
pp. 497-516; Dunkelberg, W. L., and Stafford, F. P., "Debt
in the Consumer Portfolio: Evidence from a Panel Study,"
American Economic Review, September 1971, pp. 598-
613; Hess, A. C., "A Comparison of Automobile Demand
Equations," Econometrica, April 1977, pp. 683-701; Mish-
kin, F. S., "Illiquidity, Consumer Durable Expenditures, and
Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, Septem-
ber 1976, pp. 642-54; and Sandmo, A., "The Effect of
Uncertainty on SaVing Decisions," Review of Economic
Studies, July1970, pp. 353-360.
9. The data are from continual follow-up surveys of5,000
American families in each of the nine years 1968-1976
conducted bythe SurveyResearch CenteroftheUniversity
of (theMichiganPanelSurvey). Oursample,
ever, involves only families in which the married couple
which headed the household rernained togetheroverall the
years ofthe survey.
10. The equations forthe chartstooktheformss = a +
+ cy2 (for Chart 1) and I = a + bY + cy2 (for
where S = the savings variable as described, I = income
variability, and Y permanent income. Source ofthe data
used isdescribed in footnote 9.
11. Theimportanceofthefactorspresentedintl1e th~)relti­
cal discussion was demonstrated in a regression of home-ownership on various homeowner attributes (Michigan
f'anei Survey data). Forexample,levelof permanent
income and level of savings show a statistically significant
relationshiptohomeownership. Increased incomevariabil-
ity, on the other hand, reduces the probability Of.·home
ownership for the families in the sample. Because of the
obvious relationship between home ownership and mort-
gage indebtedness,.the findings suggest that these same
variables would affectfhe.pattern.ofmortgage.indebted-
ness, although we cannot distinguish whether the factors
are supplyordemand related.
12. New York Public Interest Research Group, "Take the
Moneyand Run," NewYork, 1976.
13. The HMDA was amended in 1980 and now requires
disclosure of the number and value of mortgage loans
made by census tract only. Zipcode can no longerbe used
as a designation of neighborhood.
14. See Hearings, footnote 2, pp, 132-147.
15. Federal Reserve Bulletin, "Bank Holding Company
and Bank Merger Orders issued by the Board of Gover-
nors," March 1980, pp. 238-242.
16. The Department of Housing and Urban Development,
in its CRA guidebook, Assessing Community Credit
Needs (August 1979, p. 13), recommends that community
groups use census tractdata, coupled with. HMDAdata, to
help determine demand as well as to explain possible dis-
crepancies in loan volumes between two dissimilarcensus
tracts.
17.. With regard to the useofreal estate transfer records to
compensate for demand, evidently there is not always a
one-to-one relationship between mortgages and transfers
of real estate. The use of private or mortgage bank financ-
ing, the practiceofassuming existing mortgages, and other
factorswit! makethis linka looseone. Itis alsoverypossible
that real estate transfers are a reflection of the mortgage
market, notviceversa-people maydemand fewer homes
because they have difficulty finding mortgages.
18. The survey method of analysis has also been tried (for
instance, a study of redlining in Rochester, N.V. by George
Benston). Because this method has not been used widely
anddoesnotseemto improve uponthe marketmodels and
applications analysis, wedonot discussit in thetext.
19.· PeterM. HutChinson, James R. 05tas, J. DavidReed,
"A•Survey and Cortlparison of Redlining Influences in
Urban Mortgage Lending Markets," AREUEA Journal, 5,
Winter 1977,ppA63-472.
20.·.HarryW,RiChardson and Peter Gordon, "Measuring
MortgageDefiCiency and ItsDeterminants," TheAnnalsof
Regional Science, November 1979, 13:3, pp. 25~34; and
RobertSchafer,Mortgage lending Decisions: Criteria
andConstraints, Cambridge, Mass. 1978.
21. Seefootnote 11.
22. Ofcourse these studies assume that nopre-screening
the actual application process.
23. Robert Schaferand Helen Ladd, Equal CreditOppor-
tunity Accessibility to Mortgage Funds by Women and
by Minorities, Volume 1~3, U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office,
Washington, D.C., 1980.
24. In California, only state-chartered savings and loan
associations were involved. In NewYork, datawere Obtain-
ed from savings and loan associations, commercial banks
and mutual savings banks.
25. The Federal Reserve Bank does not require regular
reports on this subject, but the other three agencies must
collect such data on a regular basis as a result of a federal
lawsuit
26. A. Thomas King, "The Loan Application Register: A
Tool for Examiners," Federal Home loan Bank Board
Journal, August 1980, pp. 8-13.
27. One exception was the higher rate of denials among
Blacks and Hispanics. However, even if this conclusion is
valid, it is a violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
rather than CRA, and hence is not addressed in this paper.
Furthermore, we cannot say whether this finding is conclu-
sive evidence of discrimination, since race couldbe corre-
lated with certain risk factors not compensated for in the
study.
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